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Over one hundred years ago, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis wrote, "Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some
protection [of the right of privacy], there can, it is believed, be no
doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and decency."1 This observation rings even more true
today than it did when it was made in 1890. In the past hundred
years, members of the media have drastically revised the unwritten
rules regarding what topics are fair game. While media outlets
uniformly declined to publish photographs of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in a wheelchair while he was president, the press today
rarely exercises any similar kind of restraint when reporting on the
private lives of presidents or even ordinary citizens.2 One would
imagine that Bill Clinton would have been thrilled if the modern
White House Press Corps had been willing to broker such a
gentleman's agreement with regard to the publication of pictures or
information that shed light on the intimate details of his personal life.
As the Supreme Court of California recently observed, "While even in
their day Brandeis and Warren complained that 'the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast [sic] in the columns of the daily papers,'
today's public discourse is particularly notable for its detailed and
graphic discussion of intimate personal and family matters."
3
Further, the media's technological capacity to invade the private
sphere and to subsequently broadcast private facts quickly to a
national and even global audience is unprecedented. 4 Today's press is
more than willing to use this power to transgress a previously off
limits zone of privacy.
Individuals have not sat idly by as the press has pushed the
envelope regarding what sorts of information are appropriate subjects
of public scrutiny. Private parties have fought back, using both
1. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
2. See Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1999) (arguing that while "portrayals of the common person have
always been important" in both mass and elite culture, "[sitories about ordinary people...
appear to be increasing in quantity, in intensity, and in their degree of penetration into private
lives," as '"[r]eality television' programs, talk shows such as Jerry Springer, and a greater
emphasis on 'human interest' stories even in mainstream news reporting have all contributed to
a dissolving of the line between public and private figures").
3 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 847 (Cal. 1998) (internal citation
omitted).
4. Id. at 1098 ("What was once the high-tech exotica of spy movies is now readily available
to the upscale mail-order customer: cameras that can fit within a pair of eyeglasses, microphones
that hear through walls from afar to pick up the sighs and whispers of the bedroom, and
telephone taps that can make anyone a fully-equipped Linda Tripp'.").
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common law and statutory weapons, including rape shield laws,
electronic privacy statutes, and the private facts tort. Each provides
individuals with a right of action against the press for publishing
private information. However, while these legal remedies may provide
some relief to plaintiffs who have seen intimate and highly sensitive
information about themselves revealed in the pages of newspapers or
broadcast on the nightly news, they present a serious First
Amendment problem. The right to privacy provided by these laws
gives individuals, as Eugene Volokh has put it, "a right to stop people
from speaking about you." 5 Such a right is, for obvious reasons,
fundamentally in tension with the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, which provides that the state shall "make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
6
The Supreme Court has addressed the tension between speech
and privacy in a number of cases, but it has failed to establish a clear
framework for dealing with it. The Court's decisions in this area have
either rested upon narrow grounds unique to a specific statutory
scheme or have been decided with only the most perfunctory analysis.
The Court has adopted a completely ad hoc analytical approach that
not only lacks elegance, but also fails to present a coherent approach
to this area of the law or identify the fundamental theoretical and
doctrinal tensions at work. This failure is all the more disappointing
because the tension between privacy and speech is by no means a
completely novel First Amendment issue; existing First Amendment
theory and doctrine provide significant guidance regarding the proper
analytic framework for dealing with privacy laws.
This Note argues that the Court's existing general free speech
framework is perfectly capable of dealing with the tension between
speech and privacy, and explains how this framework should be
applied in cases that present a conflict between these two interests.
The Note starts from first principles and situates this conflict in the
context of the theoretical underpinnings of the Free Speech Clause,
and examines how speech on private matters fits within this broader
framework. Part II of this Note begins by discussing several
competing conceptions of the First Amendment's underlying purpose
and argues that the Court has correctly chosen to view free speech
more as a systemic right than an individual right. Part III outlines a
5. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(2000).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment's strictures have been held to apply to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 n.1 (1995) ("The term 'liberty' in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to the States.")
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doctrinal approach to First Amendment cases that best supports the
systemic model's vision of the purpose of free speech. This Part also
illustrates how the Court's current framework closely mirrors the
ideal framework under the systemic model. Part IV uses this
theoretical and doctrinal framework to analyze various arguments
that could be made for restricting speech to serve privacy interests,
and concludes that none justify restricting the publication of private
information. Part V reviews the Court's treatment of the tension
between privacy and speech interests and critiques it in light of the
framework developed in the prior Parts of this note.
II. THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A number of different theories have been put forth regarding
the fundamental values underlying freedom of speech. These different
conceptions can be grouped into two general classes. First, a number
of theorists see free speech as primarily serving individual interests in
autonomy and self-fulfillment. 7  For example, Professor David
Richards writes:
[T]he significance of free expression rests on the central human capacity to create and
express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music, intended to
communicate in determinate, complex and subtle ways. Freedom of expression permits
and encourages the exercise of these capacities: it supports a mature individual's
sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others; it disfavors
restrictions on communication imposed for the sake of the distorting rigidities of the
orthodox and the established. In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the
mature person.
8
Richards sees speech as an end in itself; any society-wide
benefit that may accrue as a result of parties exercising their
individual right to speak is simply icing on the cake.9
A competing vision of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment posits that the primary value of free speech lies not in the
importance of speech to the individual, but in the wider societal
benefits that accrue as a result of the free and open discussion of ideas
within that society. 10 Under this view, the existence of a vigorous
public debate is important not simply because it contributes to the
abstract search for truth, but because it is essential to the very
7. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 (1989); MARTIN
H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11 (1984); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 334, 353-55 (1991).
8. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
9. Id. at 62-63.
10. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25-26 (1948).
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structure of democratic government.1 The fundamental premise of
democratic government is that political power ultimately lies in the
hands of the people.' 2 The only way that such a system can produce
effective policies that represent the will of the people is if the public
has access to all relevant information and is able to discuss and debate
the relative merits of a given policy choice. If information and public
debate is distorted or seriously restricted by the government, the
public will not be able to effectively exert its power to bring about
desired results. The success of any democratic exercise is thus
dependant on the people's ability to comprehend fully the nature of a
policy issue and the probable results of any particular course of action.
As Owen Fiss argues, "The purpose of free speech is ... the
preservation of democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to
decide what kind of life it wishes to live."'13 Under this conception of
the Free Speech Clause, protection of speech may incidentally benefit
the individual speaker's interest in autonomy or self-fulfillment, but
the Clause must primarily be interpreted as an integral structural
component of democratic government.
Among those who advocate viewing speech primarily in terms
of its systemic significance to democratic government, there are two
competing theories of how best to preserve the right of the people "to
decide what kind of life it wishes to live."1 4 The "marketplace of ideas"
theory posits that the collision of competing viewpoints in a robust and
unregulated public debate is the most effective way to ensure the
eventual triumph of the truth and the maintenance of an informed
and vigilant public.' 5 Under this theory, the most persuasive
viewpoints will win the most adherents while unconvincing arguments
11. Id. at 26-27.
12. See, e.g., George J. Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennial
Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 EMORY L.J. 753, 772 (2000)
("[It is a fundamental premise of democracy that all humans, even the poor, must have a voice
in determining the future of our species and our planet."); Amy Gutmann, What is the Value of
Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 519, 528 (1997) ("A fundamental premise of
constitutional democracy (or what the founders called a 'republic' as distinct from a direct and
constitutionally unconstrained democracy) is that citizens and their accountable representatives
collectively make both better and more legitimate decisions than if self-appointed guardians
control their speech and make decisions for them."); Louis M. Seidman, Ambivalence and
Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1571 (1988) (The "ability of an elite corps of judges to
wield enormous power that is unchecked by popular opinion and criticism seems to contradict
liberal democracy's fundamental premise.").
13. OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 13 (1996).
14. Id.
15. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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and falsity fall by the wayside. 16 This vision of the First Amendment
was famously articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, in which he stated that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market."
17
A number of theorists criticize the marketplace framework on
the grounds that a completely unregulated public discussion will not
necessarily provide all viewpoints with a fair hearing.18 This school of
thought is most closely associated with the work of Alexander
Meiklejohn, who asserted that "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."19 For
Meiklejohn and those who follow in his ideological footsteps, under
some circumstances it may be necessary to "restrict the speech of some
elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others."20 While a complete discussion of this debate is beyond the
scope of this Note, the practical difficulties of instituting and
effectively administering such a limited censorship model and the very
high risk that such a theory could be used to justify undue
suppression of ideas counsel against adopting such an approach even
if it is sound in theory.2
1
The systemic and individual rights views of the underlying
purpose of the Free Speech Clause are not mutually exclusive, but the
Court has most often and most powerfully articulated the importance
of the clause in terms of its systemic significance. 22 In fact, the Court
appears to have recognized explicitly the subordinate position of the
individual "self expression" model in observing that "speech
16. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 13, at 30; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 72-73
(1993); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 61 (2d ed. 1960); Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 385-86
(1991); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 176-77 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 467-68.
19. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 18, at 26.
20. FISS, supra note 13, at 30.
21. See infra Part IV.A.4 (discussing in more depth the problems with suppressing some
speech in order to further the larger goals of the systemic model).
22. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (stating that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people").
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concerning public affairs is more than self expression; it is the essence
of self government."
23
This position makes eminent sense. The tremendous solicitude
that the Court demonstrates when dealing with speech simply cannot
be justified solely or primarily in terms of promoting individuals'
interest in self expression. While the ability to express oneself freely
may play an important role in promoting individual autonomy and
self-fulfillment, any number of other individual interests could
similarly be said to be necessary prerequisites for the attainment of
these objects. For example, a good education, high-quality medical
care, gainful employment, and a stable family life are all arguably
necessary for the achievement of self-fulfillment. It makes little sense
to read the First Amendment's prohibition on abridging the freedom of
speech to be aimed primarily at promoting individual autonomy when
so many other interests equally important to individual autonomy are
not similarly protected. In contrast, the central position that freedom
of speech holds in the constitutional framework is clearly justified if
one views the free and open exchange of ideas as essential to the very
structure of democratic government.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AS THE PRODUCT OF A SYSTEMIC
VISION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE SPEECH
Assuming that one accepts the systemic perspective on the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, the
clause should be interpreted in a way that ensures the realization of
the thriving marketplace of ideas that the systemic view holds to be
vital to the functioning of democratic government. The Supreme
Court's current overarching doctrinal approach is perfectly
constructed to address the two different categories of speech
regulations that pose a problem under the systemic model: First, laws
that censor specific content; second, laws that reduce the aggregate
amount of speech in the marketplace.
23. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Occasionally, the Court's opinions
seem to place the self-expression model alongside the systemic model as an equally compelling
interpretation of the First Amendment, but this is belied by the actual analysis in these opinions,
in which the Court focuses on the broader social importance of speech as opposed to the
importance of speech to the individual. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149,
152 (1967) (stating that the First Amendment "is as much a guarantee to individuals of their
personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community ... as it is a
social necessity required for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open society,"' but
analyzing what areas of speech are theoretically deserving of First Amendment protection based




Governmental regulations that punish the expression of
particular content are deeply problematic because they seek to shape
and manipulate the marketplace of ideas. 24 Such content distortion
violates the most basic principle of democratic government by denying
the public the opportunity to make a fair and reasoned assessment of
a class of ideas that may alter its policy preferences. 25 Content-based
regulations allow the government-not the people-to set the political
agenda and dictate the scope of public debate, thereby depriving the
public of the fundamental right to "decide what kind of life it wishes to
live." 26 Such regulations are therefore suspect even if they are not
necessarily hostile to the message conveyed by the banned content.
Although deliberate censorship of certain viewpoints may present a
particularly acute First Amendment problem, "viewpoint-neutral"
content-based regulations still manipulate public discussion by
declaring certain topics "off limits." 27
Content regulations, however, are less problematic if they
target expression that is not part of the ultimate marketplace ideal.
The systemic model aims to create conditions under which an open
and frank public dialogue can take place so that members of the
voting public can make fully informed choices about how to exercise
their political power. Under this model, the ideal marketplace is a
participatory forum for discussion whose aim is to further greater
understanding of the world in which the participants live. There are
certain categories of speech that not only fail to add to this vision of
public dialogue, but can substantively impair it. These categories
include, among others, false statements of fact and speech that
advocates the overthrow of the government or some other illegal act.
False statements do not add to the aggregate amount of knowledge in
24. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 198 (1983) ("[T]he [Flirst [A]mendment is concerned, not only with the extent to which
a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also - and perhaps even more
fundamentally - with the extent to which the law distorts public debate.").
25. FISS, supra note 13, at 65-66.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Some writers argue that viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulations do not pose any
greater threat to speech than content-neutral laws, and as a result all viewpoint-neutral speech
regulations, including both content-based and content-neutral regulations, should be subject to
the same level of scrutiny. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 544-46 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Paul Stephan, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 passim (1982). Justice Stevens points out that some
"content-based" restrictions, such as barring speech about baseball in a law school class or
regulating oral arguments in the Supreme Court, do not pose any serious threat to First
Amendment values. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 544-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the marketplace. 28 They can only serve to mislead individuals, causing
them to view the world based on faulty factual assumptions.2 9 Speech
that advocates revolution or other illegal acts is not logically protected
under the systemic theory because its goal is to undermine the very
system that the systemic theory seeks to preserve. 30 The purpose of
free speech under the systemic model is to better enable the public to
make informed choices about policy issues, including what sorts of
binding legal obligations to establish.31 Advocating for the violation of
laws that are the product of that democratic process is, therefore,
content that can be excluded from the marketplace without violating
the underlying purpose of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court takes account of this "low" value speech by
employing a two-tiered approach in the content-based realm. This
approach affords "core" First Amendment speech significant protection
while providing "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech," which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas" far
less of a constitutional shield.32 If the Court determines that the
speech at issue is not of "low" value, it will review the regulatory
interference with speech under a standard that approaches absolute
protection, subjecting it to "the most exacting scrutiny."33 This strict
scrutiny approach reflects the Court's belief that "above all else, the
First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."34 To overcome strict scrutiny, the government must show
that the regulation serves a "compelling interest" and that it has
chosen "the least restrictive means" to further that interest. 35 The
Court is particularly hostile to "viewpoint-based" regulations, a
subcategory of content-based restrictions aimed solely at suppressing
28. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[T]here is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.").
29. Id. But see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 22 (1998)
(arguing that even false statements of fact should not be censored).
30. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545, 549 (1951) ("On any scale of values which
we have hitherto recognized, speech of this sort ranks low .... Of course no government can
recognize a 'right' of revolution, or a 'right' to incite revolution if the incitement has no other
purpose or effect.").
31. See FISS, supra note 13, at 13.
32. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), superseded by statute, ALA.
CODE § 13A-11-8 (LexisNexis 2006).
33. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
34. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
35. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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a disfavored message. 36 The Court appears to view such regulations as
per se unconstitutional.
37
The Court applies far less exacting standards of review to
content-based restrictions on low value speech, including false
statements of fact, advocacy of an illegal act, obscenity, commercial
speech, and fighting words. 38 Of course, the Court may be wrong about
exactly which classes of speech properly fall into the low value
category, but, as discussed above, the idea of excluding some of these
categories from the marketplace of ideas is at least sound in theory
under the systemic model.
3 9
The second category of government regulation that presents a
First Amendment problem is content-neutral regulation that
incidentally affects speech interests. Governmental regulations that
do not single out particular content for unfavorable treatment but that
nonetheless curb an individual's ability to express himself are
problematic because they shrink the aggregate amount of information
and opinion that reaches the marketplace. 40 The systemic model's
vision of the marketplace of ideas is not concerned solely with
preventing manipulation and distortion of the marketplace. This
36. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is any bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."). Although some
writers have argued that the Court should only apply the compelling interest standard to
viewpoint-based restriction on speech, see Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 544-46 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Stephan, supra note 27, at 203, the
Court has applied the compelling interest test to a number of viewpoint-neutral, content-based
regulations. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (striking
down a rule barring candidates for judicial office from discussing issues likely to come before the
courts). However, the Court appears to apply a less-rigorous version of the compelling interest
test to viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulations. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211
(1992) (upholding a restriction on political speech near polling places after applying strict
scrutiny).
37. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414
38. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976) (commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340. (1974) (defamation);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (advocacy of an illegal act); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(fighting words), superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (LexisNexis 2006).
39. The Court has been strongly criticized for including commercial speech and obscenity in
the low value category. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 519-28 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (commercial speech); Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (obscenity).
40. See Stone, supra note 24, at 192-93 ('The Court's primary concern in the content-
neutral realm is that such restrictions, by limiting the availability of particular means of
communication, can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate their views to
others. This is, of course, a central first amendment concern, for to the extent that content-
neutral restrictions actually reduce the total quantity of expression, they necessarily undermine
the 'search for truth,' impede meaningful participation in 'self-governance,' and frustrate
individual 'self-fulfillment.' ").
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model also aims to ensure the existence of an active public dialogue.
The fact that a given regulation burdens all content equally is of little
consolation if its practical effect is to completely or substantially
prevent all speakers from engaging in open and vigorous discussion.
Preventing targeted censorship and government manipulation
accomplishes little if expression has been squeezed out by neutral
regulation that incidentally burdens speech.
In contrast to content-based regulations, content-neutral
regulations are not necessarily problematic under the systemic model
of free speech. 41 While it is generally never permissible for the
government to pick and choose what ideas or information to suppress,
dampening expression in an evenhanded manner does not present a
serious First Amendment problem unless the restriction limits the
ability of an idea or piece of information to be effectively conveyed in
the marketplace of ideas.42 Even then, some reduction in the ability to
express information may be palatable under the systemic rights
theory if the government has an appreciable interest in the speech-
restricting regulation and the speaker has alternative means of
expressing that information.
43
The Court has formulated several different tests that seek to
address the speech concerns raised by content-neutral regulations
that have an incidental impact on speech. When a law regulates
"expressive conduct," such as burning a draft card, in which " 'speech'
and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct", the Court has stated that the regulation will be sustained
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
44
The Court has also articulated a standard for laws that regulate the
time, place, or manner of expression on public property: in places that
serve as traditional public forums or have been designated by the
state as a place of expressive activity, the state may enforce time,
place, or manner restrictions "which are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication." 45
41. Id. at 193.
42. Id. at 193, 198.
43. Id. at 193.
44. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
45. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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The time, place, or manner standard appears to be
substantially different from the expressive conduct standard, in that
the former requires a consideration of the alternative channels left
open to the speaker. However, in reality the burden on the
government to demonstrate the existence of a substantial interest and
the absence of less restrictive alternatives varies in the expressive
conduct standard depending on the speaker's available alternative
means of expression. 46 Further, the Court has stated that the
expressive conduct test "in the last analysis is little, if any, different
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions."
47
This makes sense, as both scenarios present essentially the same
problem-the restriction on the use of a particular means of
communication. The Court's various multi-pronged tests in this area
of the law simply appear to be rather clumsy attempts to mask what
ultimately is a simple exercise in balancing the weight of the interests
on each side of the speech equation discounted by the available
alternative means available to further these interests.
48
IV. PRIVACY IN THE SYSTEMIC RIGHTS MODEL
If speakers choose to reveal intimate details about private
parties, under what conditions, if any, can the state penalize them for
doing so? Giving individuals "a right to stop people from speaking
about you" presents an obvious First Amendment problem.49 Such a
right is fundamentally in tension with the concept of free and open
debate that lies at the heart of the systemic rights theory of free
speech. This Section discusses two categories of privacy statutes and
evaluates various arguments for and against their constitutionality.
First, rights of action that permit an individual to seek damages for
the publication of defined private content are discussed. 50 Second,
statutes that provide a right of action for the publication of "stolen"
information, in which the individual can seek damages not because of
the content of the published information but because of the means in
which it was obtained, are considered.
5 1
46. Stone, supra note 24, at 191 & n.5.
47. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
48. See Stone, supra note 24, at 210 (arguing that the Court's content-neutral approach is
in reality far more flexible than one would think based on the language of the standard alone).
49. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 1069.
50. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987) (illegal to publish a rape victim's name); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-23 (2006) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (2005) (same); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-3
(LexisNexis 2006) (illegal to publish a juvenile's name in connection with court proceeding); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (West 1958) (same) (repealed 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652
(1977) (private facts tort).
51. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2006).
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A. Content-Based Restrictions on the Publication of Private
Information
There are two species of legal actions that provide for the
punishment of speakers based upon their publication of private
content: statutory prohibitions on the publication of specifically
enumerated categories of information and the more general disclosure
of private facts tort. Specific statutory prohibitions are very
straightforward and provide for the imposition of either civil or
criminal penalties for publishing a narrow designated class of
protected information, such as the names of juvenile offenders or rape
victims. 5 2 In contrast, the public disclosure tort is a broader right of
action that applies to any information that may be considered
"private."53 The private facts tort is highly fact-sensitive and requires
the application of principles that are somewhat vague and not easily
defined or applied. 54 According to the Second Restatement of Torts's
definition of the "publicity given to private life" tort, "One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."55
Both statutory prohibitions on publishing certain information
and the private facts tort are content-based interferences with speech.
They represent a judgment that publicizing this sort of content is
inherently bad or inappropriate. As such, these restrictions can only
be justified under the systemic model of speech that underlies the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence if: (1) private information, or
at least the private information that is suppressed by these
restrictions, is not part of the marketplace ideal that the systemic
model seeks to advance, (2) there is a competing constitutional right
that must be balanced against free speech, (3) the government can
satisfy the compelling interest test, or (4) privacy rights enhance
rather than restrict speech. This Section considers the validity of each
of these arguments in turn. It also considers the possibility that these
"privacy rights" could be reconceptualized as "property rights," and as
a result be viewed as content-neutral protections of property subject to
52. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 2006) (illegal to publish a rape victim's name); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (2006) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (2006) (same); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-7-3 (LexisNexis 2006) (illegal to publish a juvenile's name in connection with court
proceeding); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (West 2006) (same).





a significantly less searching standard of review, rather than as
content-based restrictions on speech subject to strict scrutiny.
1. Private Information as "Low" Value Speech
Examples of facts that are generally considered private under
the common law include information relating to sexual relations;
family quarrels; unpleasant, disgraceful or humiliating illnesses;
intimate personal letters; and details of a person's activities in his
home.56 While at first blush such information may seem to have no
legitimate place in the marketplace of ideas, the idea that one can
make a theoretical distinction between "newsworthy" and "non-
newsworthy" information based upon the "privateness" of that
information, or that independent of "privateness" one can make a
principled distinction between newsworthy and non-newsworthy
private information, is questionable in theory and unworkable in
practice. Any inquiry into whether a piece of private information is
"newsworthy" inevitably devolves into a value-laden subjective inquiry
into what criteria "right thinking" members of society should consider
when making decisions. 57 This is precisely the sort of manipulation of
the marketplace of ideas that the First Amendment seeks to guard
against.
There is no reason to think that "private" information does not
add substantively to the marketplace of ideas. Information about other
people's most intimate private affairs can fundamentally affect how
we view the world and what we think about various public policies.58
Indeed, the Second Restatement of Torts concedes that intimate
private information pertaining to
homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death from the use of narcotics, a rare disease,
the birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have
been murdered years ago, a report to the police concerning the escape of a wild animal
and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less deplorable, popular
appeal is newsworthy.
5 9
The private lives of celebrities in particular have the capacity
to cause major shifts in public opinion. For example, the well-
publicized "coming out" of Ellen Degeneres and Rosie O'Donnell had a
significant effect on the public debate over the morality of
56. Id. at § 652D cmt. b.
57. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 1089-95.
58. Id.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977).
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homosexuality.60 Similarly, Magic Johnson's announcement that he
was HIV-positive had a dramatic impact on the way a number of
Americans viewed the AIDS epidemic.
61
The Restatement tries to draw a line between newsworthy and
non-newsworthy information "when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards,
would say that he had no concern."62 However, speech that could be
categorized as "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake" can affect public opinion just as much as speech on more
"legitimate" topics. Information about our neighbors' sex lives, for
example, informs our views about what is "normal" and socially-
acceptable behavior. Discovering that a respected member of the
community is gay might change public perceptions about the morality
of homosexuality and the desirability of extending antidiscrimination
laws to include sexual orientation or adopting a constitutional
amendment banning gay marriage. Professor Volokh points out that
speech on such "daily life matter[s] ... indirectly but deeply affects
the way we view the world, deal with others, evaluate their moral
claims on us, and even vote; and its effect is probably greater than
that of most of the paintings we see or the editorials we read."
63
While one person may believe that a person's sexuality has
nothing to do with their capacity to serve in public office, someone else
60. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, A Niche No More: Gay Celebrities are in Demand as Endorsers
for Mainstream Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at C10 (discussing how the increasing
visibility of gays and lesbians in popular culture through shows like "Queer Eye for the Straight
Guy" and 'Will and Grace," as well as "decisions by stars like Ellen DeGeneres and Rosie
O'Donnell to openly discuss their sexuality," has led mainstream advertisers to feel more
comfortable hiring gay and lesbian celebrities to endorse their products despite concerns that by
doing so advertisers will expose themselves to complaints that "they are themselves endorsing
what the critics describe as the homosexual agenda"); Alison Glock, She Likes to Watch, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 2 (Television), at 26 (discussing how lesbianism has become "hip" as a
result of a number of events and trends in popular culture, and stating "Reality dating shows
revealed girls necking in hot tubs. Rosie O'Donnell came out. Girls went wild. Madonna planted
one on Britney. Ellen DeGeneres's sexuality, once viewed as toxic enough to sink a sitcom,
morphed into a nonissue benign enough for her to have her own daytime chat show").
61. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, For a Promising but Poor Girl, A Struggle Over Sex and Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at Al ("For an earlier generation, the safe-sex message may have come
home when Magic Johnson announced he was infected with H.I.V. and retired from basketball in
1991."); Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Double Lives On The Down Low, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 6, at
28 (stating that the fiction that AIDS was just a white disease "ceased to be viable when Magic
Johnson told a national television audience that he was H.I.V.-positive. AIDS organizations were
flooded with calls from panicked black men and women wanting to know more about the
disease"); Tricia Rose, The New AIDS Fight; Race, Sex and Stigmas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at
A19 ("For African-Americans, Magic Johnson is the public face of AIDS.").
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
63. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1093.
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may believe that it is a highly relevant criterion that reflects on the
moral stature of a candidate. A court declaring a person's sexuality to
be a relatively unimportant topic of public discussion essentially
amounts to a court imposing its value judgment on the rest of society
and usurping the public's right to make its own decision about what
characteristics are pertinent to a candidate's fitness for office.
64
Volokh is particularly cogent on this point: "Judges are of course
entitled to have their own views about which things 'right-thinking
members of society' should 'recognize' and which they should forget;
but it seems to me that under the First Amendment members of
society have a constitutional right to think things through in their
own ways."
65
It is difficult to think of a piece of private information that in
no way concerns a topic of public significance. The Court seems to
recognize this, having held the name of a rape victim to be a matter of
public concern. 66 While the name of a rape victim may seem to add
relatively little to the marketplace of ideas, it does add something.
Referring to a rape victim anonymously detracts from the narrative
power of a news story; if a reader, listener, or viewer knows the actual
name of a victim, this may better impress upon them the true
seriousness of the crime, especially if they live in a small enough
community that they know the victim either personally or by
reputation. The Court has pointed out the narrative power of the
"concrete and particular" in the context of a lawyer presenting
evidence before a jury, a situation which can be analogized to a
reporter telling a story to his reader, viewer, or listener:
Evidence ... has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come
together a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to
sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and
particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the
law places on them . .. . When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of
what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract
statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance,
and so to implicate the law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in
judgment.
6 7
Both the lawyer in the courtroom and the journalist in the
pressroom seek to accomplish the same objective-to create a powerful
narrative that grabs the audience and forces them to actively engage
the facts of a case or a story. Being able to employ the "persuasive
64. Id. at 1089-92.
65. Id. at 1091.
66. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-37 (1989) (holding that the news article in which a
rape victim's name was released concerned a "matter of public significance").
67. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1997).
[Vol. 60:1:235250
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
power of the concrete and particular" is essential for both
"storytellers" to do this effectively.
The one category of private content that comes the closest to
being absolutely devoid of any newsworthy value, either in enabling
individuals to make decisions about political candidates or daily life
issues, is graphic depiction of people in the most compromising
situations, such as having sexual intercourse or using the bathroom. 68
It may seem questionable whether employing such a graphic depiction
as opposed to a toned-down synopsis would truly enhance the
narrative power of a news story. If a blogger wants to point out the
hypocrisy of a politician having an extramarital affair while running
on a family-values platform, does the blogger really need to upload a
video of one of the politician's sexual rendezvous to make his point? At
the level of pure abstraction, perhaps not. The video does not contain
any additional facts-the sole aim of broadcasting it would seem to be
to titillate and embarrass. But even in this scenario, while the
broadcast may not contain any additional raw facts, seeing someone
cheating on his wife as opposed to reading a sanitized account would
undoubtedly leave a deeper and more lasting impression. Seeing a
video or reading a very detailed written account makes the event more
"real" than simply hearing a synopsis. A voter with a vague idea that
a politician engaged in certain "sexual indiscretions" might be able to
ignore or at least discount such behavior when choosing whom to
support, but that same voter may be far less likely to forgive if he
hears details about a cigar and stained dress. Such depictions can both
humanize and demonize a person.69 They are powerful narrative tools
that can shape the way that individuals view the world.70
Even if it were possible to draw some theoretical line dividing
newsworthy private information from that which is non-newsworthy,
one could be forgiven for being skeptical of the institutional capacity of
the courts to put aside personal biases about what information "right-
thinking" members of society should consider in formulating their
worldviews. 71 And with the private lives of the Justices' themselves
68. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1094-95.
69. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, The Testing of a President: The Four Hours; Weighing
Shame and Sympathy, A Weary People Watch Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at Al
(describing how some viewers reacted with pity and others with disgust after watching Bill
Clinton's taped testimony regarding his affair with Monica Lewinsky).
70. Judge Frank Easterbrook has pointed out the powerful effect of graphic pornographic
speech on society's views of women. See Am. Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th
Cir. 1985).
71. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which upheld the
Boy Scouts right under the Free Speech Clause to express their disapproval of homosexuality by
excluding an otherwise qualified scoutmaster from the organization because he was gay,
provides a good example of a judge letting his personal beliefs about what right thinking
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becoming a topic of public interest,72 it would not be surprising if the
Court became more and more sympathetic to casting the "non-
newsworthy" net over an increasingly wide area.
2. Privacy as a Competing Constitutional Interest
Even if a privacy law violated the First Amendment, the law
might still be constitutional if it furthered a competing constitutional
interest in individual privacy. 73 Under such circumstances the Court
would be forced to balance these conflicting constitutional rights
against each other. However, there are several fundamental problems
with this analysis. First, sidestepping the contentious question of
whether the Constitution should be read to provide a right to
privacy, 74  the Court has carefully eschewed expanding the
constitutional right of privacy established in Roe and Griswold beyond
the right to abortion and the use of contraceptives. 75 The Court has
never held that the Due Process Clause provides a fundamental
constitutional right to private personal information.
Second, assuming that such a constitutional right to
information privacy did exist, it would be a right against the
members of society should think permeate his views on what speech is protected under the First
Amendment. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (2000).
Justice Stevens referred to unfavorable opinions about homosexuals as "atavistic," and his
dissenting opinion seems to strongly imply that such views are so wrong and distasteful that
they are simply undeserving of First Amendment protection. See id.
72. Jeffrey Toobin writes, "In the months since Sandra Day O'Connor announced her
retirement, Americans have become obsessed with judge-watching. The new pastime practically
eclipsed the World Series, with fans paying more attention to Harriet Miers's eye makeup than
to Jermaine Dye's batting average." Jeffrey Toobin, SCOTUS Watch, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 21,
2005, at 44. Toobin also remarks on the enormous popularity of an online blog, "Underneath
Their Robes," in which the site's author "writes like a boozy d~butante, dishing about the
wardrobes, work habits, and idiosyncrasies of the 'superhotties of the federal judiciary' and
'Bodacious Babes of the Bench.'" Id.
73. See Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1224 (1990) (arguing that speech and privacy are competing constitutional
values that must be balanced against each other).
74. John Hart Ely famously remarked that Roe v. Wade "is bad because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an
obligation to try to be." John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J, 920, 947 (1973).
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that the "right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that
marriage falls within the right of personal privacy, and that a law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives violated that right). The Court declined to find a constitutional right to privacy
implicated in the decision to commit suicide or engage in private sexual relations. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (no right to assisted suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 190 (1986) (right to privacy does not extend to homosexual sodomy), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a sodomy law as unconstitutional, but not on the
grounds that the law violated a fundamental constitutional right to privacy).
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government and not against private publishers. The Constitution only
limits government power, it does not operate as a restriction on the
conduct of purely private parties. 76 There is no violation of a
constitutional right when a private party abridges a person's freedom
of speech, prevents his free exercise of religion, or interferes with any
other right enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Such private interference
may violate the person's legal rights as defined in state or federal law,
but they do not violate the person's constitutional rights.
3. Privacy as a Compelling Governmental Interest
While a content-based restriction is presumptively
unconstitutional under the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
the restriction can still pass constitutional muster if the government
can demonstrate both that the regulation serves a "compelling
interest" and that the government has chosen "the least restrictive
means" to further that interest.77 The problem with this standard is
that any determination that a particular interest is "compelling" will
ultimately reflect little more than a subjective belief that the interest
at issue is extremely important to the decisionmaker. Individuals with
different life experiences and political views will undoubtedly differ on
the import of any given interest. Every person likely has his own pet
interest that he believes is just important enough to be considered
"compelling." In light of this, one must be especially wary of
conclusory compelling interest arguments. That is, such arguments
should not be based on a simple visceral distaste for a particular
category of speech. Instead, compelling interest arguments should be
based upon a principled analysis of what interests legitimately
warrant compromising an essential structural element of democratic
government.
Most arguments in favor of viewing privacy as one of the most
important human goods employ precisely the sort of "intuitionist"
analysis that should viewed with heightened suspicion when deciding
what constitutes a "compelling interest."7 8 When stripped of the
rhetorical flourishes that so often seem to accompany theoretical
76. The state action doctrine can subject private actors to Constitutional obligations under
certain conditions, but those conditions are not present here. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001) (discussing the state action doctrine
generally).
77. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Of course, as noted
above, any viewpoint-based restriction will per se fail the compelling interest test. See supra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
78. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,




inquiries into the importance of privacy 79 and distilled down to its
most basic logical structure, the argument for viewing privacy as a
compelling governmental interest is that people intuitively grasp that
invasions of privacy are horrible80 and "threaten our very integrity as
persons."81 It is difficult to directly counter such arguments because
they rely more on feeling than logic: Privacy is a fundamental right
because it just is and everybody knows it is. It would surely be a
pointless exercise to try to convince someone that he is mistaken about
the depth of his own visceral distaste for invasions of privacy.
However, the intuitionist argument that privacy is one of the
most important human goods is grounded not only in the subjective
impressions of a handful of legal scholars but also on the objectively
verifiable position that these subjective impressions are universally
shared. Indeed, the primary persuasive force of the intuitionist
argument lies in its assertion that a deep visceral revulsion to
invasions of a defined private space is inherent in all human beings. If
such feelings are not common to all human societies and fixed over
time, the argument that privacy is fundamental to "our very integrity
as persons"8 2 seems somewhat farfetched. If privacy preferences do
vary significantly over time and across societies, then the most that
could reasonably be asserted is that privacy is a very strong cultural
preference, as opposed to a prerequisite for "personhood."
Anthropological and historical evidence strongly suggests that
privacy preferences are indeed largely the product of cultural
influences and that ideas about what must be kept private differ
dramatically depending on the cultural context.8 3 For example, in
some societies, individuals feel comfortable defecating or having sex in
79. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1110-16. Volokh discusses and dismisses some of the more
hyperbolic arguments that have been made about the importance of privacy rights, such as one
author's claim that:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and
whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public
scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity. Such an
individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be
different .... Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an
individual.
Id. (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964)).
80. See Whitman, supra note 78, at 1153-55 (summarizing and critiquing the "intuitionist"
argument in favor of strong privacy rights, and singling out Charles Fried in particular as a
writer "with a real literary gift" who was able to craft a particularly powerful intuitionist
argument about the necessity of privacy).
81. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968).
82. Id.
83. See Whitman, supra note 78, at 1153-55.
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public.8 4 Views about what subjects are "private" even differ
substantially among modern western societies.8 5 Americans and
Europeans have very different opinions about what topics are properly
considered part of the private sphere, disagreeing over issues as
diverse as the propriety of public nudity and the revelation of personal
financial information.8 6 Professor James Whitman argues that this is
not simply the product of disparate superficial or aesthetic
preferences, but of fundamentally distinct political values.
8 7
The primary value in protecting privacy, therefore, is not to
promote something necessary for humans to maintain "our very
integrity as persons,"88  but rather to satisfy strong personal
preferences that are the product of a particular social milieu. This is
not to disparage the importance of privacy in American life; the fact
that privacy preferences are culturally determined does not mean that
privacy is not an important interest. However, if privacy is not
essential for "personhood," then the argument for finding privacy to be
a "compelling interest" is reduced to preventing the emotional distress
that results from severe embarrassment and a perceived loss of
esteem in the eyes of others. While this may be a substantial interest,
it should not be prized above or alongside an institution that
comprises an essential structural element of democratic government.
Admittedly, human dignity itself is one of the foundational
values of liberal democracies like the United States.8 9 Liberal
democracy, however, seeks to preserve human dignity in a particular
way-by allowing the people as autonomous individuals to make
choices about their collective future through the mechanism of
representative government, guaranteeing certain basic civil and
political rights, and providing equal access to courts of law to seek
redress for wrongs.90 Political choice, individual rights, and the rule of
84. Id. at 1153-54.
85. Id. passim (contrasting American and European views on privacy).
86. Id. at 1155-57.
87. Id. at 1219. Whitman argues that Europeans value privacy rights primarily because
they contribute to human dignity, while Americans value privacy rights more because they act as
a bulwark against government intrusion. Id.
88. Fried, supra note 81, at 477.
89. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 467 (2005)
("[Alithough not uniquely a democratic value, the idea of human dignity undergirds liberal
democracy-the system of government in which political coercion can only be justified and
exercised when consistent with respect for the free and equal nature of all human persons.");
Miriam Rokeach & John Denvir, Front-Loading Due Process: A Dignity-Based Approach to
School Discipline, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 288 (2006) (stating that a fundamental principle of
democratic government is the dignity of the individual).
90. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 511 (1995) ("Liberal democracy .... denotes some form of representative
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law are the means employed by liberal democracies to preserve human
dignity. The democratic project would fail if the people's ability to
make informed political choices was circumscribed by speech codes
that prized self-esteem and emotional tranquility above free
expression. While in the short term this may seem like a trade-off
between free speech and dignity, it is the product of a sound judgment
that, in the long run, human dignity is best preserved by the
maintenance of a vigorous public discussion and an informed
citizenry.
Further, deciding that preventing severe emotional distress is
a proper ground for curbing speech in the privacy context would lead
one down a dangerously steep slippery slope. 91 Speech on private
matters is by no means the only category of expression that could be
said to deeply offend those who hear it. For example, some party could
legitimately claim to be severely upset and offended by another
burning the American flag, expressing a belief in the superiority of a
given race or culture, or derisively referring to a public official as a
communist. If free expression ended where emotional distress began,
the outer bounds of the right to speak one's mind would be determined
primarily by the ebb and flow of prevailing cultural sensitivities. A
shift in the public mood against a certain type of "offensive" speech
would very quickly result in increased restrictions on the offending
content. Such a result is inconsistent with the spirited public debate
that is the lifeblood of democratic government. While some speakers
may use their First Amendment right to disseminate content that is
deeply distressing to other member of the community, this is one of
the costs of living in a free and open society. As Salman Rushdie has
observed, "[D]emocracy is not a polite business."9
2
It might be argued that invasions of privacy cause emotional
distress and embarrassment on a completely different scale than that
which results from the display of highly offensive images, the
expression of hateful viewpoints, or the making of vicious insults.
Subjecting the most private acts of an individual living in
contemporary America to constant scrutiny does not simply cause that
individual discomfort, so the argument would go, but causes them
serious psychological trauma by depriving them of any sanctuary from
government secured by the separation of powers, constitutional guarantees of civil and political
rights, juridical equality, and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.")
91. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 1113 ('The more courts conclude that avoidance of
disrespect or emotional distress is a 'compelling interest' that justifies restricting the speech we
find worthless, the more likely they will be to accept the same arguments for restricting the
speech we value.").
92. Ashutosh Varsney, The Political Rushdie, 10 J. INT'L INST. (2003), http://www.umich.
edu/-iinet/journal]vollOno3/rushdie.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
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the stresses of the outside world. While it may be true that being
forced to live one's life in front of a camera would be a stressful
experience for most Americans, it is not clear that being barraged with
racial epithets would be a substantially less traumatizing experience.
In any case, this sort of extreme deprivation of privacy is not
what is at stake when newspapers publish private information about a
person. Such publications expose private facts, but they certainly do
not subject the person to the kind of constant observation that could
be said to deprive them of any sanctuary from the stresses of the
outside world. Even in the most egregious disclosure of private facts
hypotheticals, such as the broadcast of a tape of a person having sex or
going to the bathroom, the intrusion only invades a fixed slice of time
in that person's life. Such a broadcast would undoubtedly embarrass
the person in the tape. However, the great majority of this person's
private life, including every other time that person had sex, used the
bathroom, or engaged in any other intimately private activity, remains
shielded from the public eye. Thus, whether the law restricts the
publication or broadcast of private information does not determine the
extent to which individuals are able to maintain a sanctuary from the
stresses of the outside world. The rights of action that actually do
provide substantive protections for this private sphere, such as
trespass, pose no First Amendment problems. 93
4. Privacy as Speech Promoting
In some sense the privacy versus speech debate may be said to
be a false conflict: A reasonable expectation of privacy is necessary in
order for people to be willing to participate in the marketplace of
ideas.9 4 Without such an expectation of privacy, individuals may be
93. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 1111. Volokh argues that even if all restriction on the
publication of private information were unconstitutional:
[W]e'd still have a world where much of our privacy can be protected by legal rules
that restrain private trespass, wiretapping, and electronic eavesdropping; by
constitutional restraints on government searches; by statutory restraints on
government collection and revelation of personal information; by contractual
obligations on the part of people to whom we must reveal data; by market pressure on
many businesses not to reveal data about their customers; by technological self-
protection that can hide our identity in many online transactions; and by social
norms. Some might still think that this world permits undue intrusions on privacy,
but it hardly seems to risk the actual destruction of dignity, integrity, freedom, and
independence, or the impossibility (not just difficulty, but impossibility) of intimacy
and even personhood.
Id.
94. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607,
1651, 1701-02 (1999) (discussing how internet privacy should be protected in order to further
democratic deliberation); Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71
WASH. L. REV. 683, 687, 710 (1996) (discussing that the privacy versus speech debate as it is
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less willing to voice their opinions in the public sphere for fear of
others retaliating against them by publicizing embarrassing personal
information. As discussed above, such an argument for the
constitutionality of privacy protections cannot be based on a notion of
competing constitutional interests-that one person's First
Amendment right to speak about another's private life conflicts with
that other person's First Amendment's right not to be intimidated into
remaining silent-because as long as the person speaking about
another's private life is not a state actor, the First Amendment does
not bar him from restricting others' speech. Rather, one would have to
argue that promoting speech by timid speakers who would otherwise
not contribute to the marketplace of ideas in the absence of privacy
protections constitutes a compelling governmental interest. This
compelling interest inquiry differs from that explored in the previous
section because the asserted compelling interest is not privacy but the
promotion of speech itself.
Because the primary underlying purpose of the First
Amendment is to promote the existence of a robust marketplace of
ideas, the notion that promoting speech by timid speakers is a
"compelling interest" has a great deal of appeal. After all, truth cannot
"get itself accepted in the competition of the market" if the only person
who knows the truth is intimidated into remaining silent. 95 Promoting
speech by timid speakers could greatly enrich the diversity of views
expressed in the marketplace by equalizing parties' abilities to
effectively disseminate their ideas. If a handful of the loudest and
most shrill voices dominated public debate because of their bullying
tactics, this result would not seem to embody the vision of democracy
and civic discourse that the systemic theory seeks to promote.
However, there are several reasons why the argument that
privacy protections promote the quantity and quality of speech in the
aggregate and are therefore constitutional should ultimately be
rejected. As discussed in the previous Section, a similar rationale
could be used to justify cutting wide swathes through other protected
areas of speech. 96 Speech that may cause some people to be
uncomfortable, embarrassed, or offended may also act to stifle speech.
The fear of being insulted, subjected to ridicule, or simply shown to be
wrong or ignorant no doubt keeps a number of potential speakers out
of the public debate. A rule against such "intimidating" speech would
give the most sensitive member of the community a listener's veto on
generally construed is too simple because oftentimes protecting one can promote values protected
by the other).
95. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1107-08.
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discussion that for whatever reason makes them more reticent to
speak up. Public debate is often, perhaps by necessity, a rough and
tumble affair. As such, the systemic vision underlying First
Amendment theory prizes an informed and vigilant populace over
preventing the embarrassment of the more thin-skinned members of
the community. As Judge Posner has written, "By publishing your
views you invite public criticism and rebuttal; you enter voluntarily
into one of the submarkets of ideas and opinions and consent therefore
to the rough competition of the marketplace."97 Achieving a greater
participation rate in public debate would be a pyrrhic victory if the
debate were completely sanitized because speakers' primary concern
was not effectively advocating an idea but avoiding offending the
squeamish. While it may be regrettable that more timid speakers shy
away from contributing to the marketplace of ideas, this is a relatively
small price to pay in order to have an uninhibited and robust public
discussion. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea
that the First Amendment permits the government to engineer
equality of access in the marketplace. 98 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
stated,
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources,' " and " 'to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.'" 99
Further, even if one were to accept the argument that
abridging some individuals' speech in order to encourage others' was
permissible and desirable in theory, such a regime would be
unworkable in practice. A policy of equal participation would require
the state to constantly police the marketplace of ideas to protect timid
speakers. It would also require the government to set a level for the
"acceptable" level of "intimidating" speech in the marketplace. Such an
arbitrary target and pervasive enforcement apparatus would
undoubtedly result in the undue suppression of ideas. It is simply
unimaginable that any regulatory agency would possess the near-
omniscience and unfailing good faith that would be necessary to
effectively administer this regime.
97. Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996).
98. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). But see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 18, at 26
(arguing that under the First Amendment, "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said.").
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269
(1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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5. Property Rights in Private Information
One possible way to sidestep the strict scrutiny test's stringent
requirements would be to attempt to recast content-based restrictions
on the publication of private information as efforts to protect
individuals' property interests in intimate private details regarding
their personal lives.100 For example, a legislature could enact a statute
giving all individuals a property interest in information about their
private sexual encounters, and individuals could assert common law
property rights against third parties who tried to "steal" or
"appropriate" this property by publishing it. Because property law is a
content-neutral regulatory regime whose purpose is to protect
property rights, such a regime would not seem to trigger strict
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
provides strong support for this approach. In Cowles, a newspaper
breached its promise of confidentiality to a source by publishing the
source's identity. 101 The Court held that the First Amendment did not
bar the source from collecting damages under the contract doctrine of
promissory estoppel, explaining that "generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." 102 Under Cowles, private enforcement of property rights in
private information against third parties should be perfectly
acceptable. Instead of enforcing contract law to prevent publication,
the proposed framework involves property law to prevent publication.
The problem with this property-law based framework is that
while the Court's holding in Cowles may have been correct, the
majority opinion's sweeping statement that "generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
report the news" conflicts with the Court's existing First Amendment
jurisprudence. 10 3 The Cowles opinion made two major analytical
100. A number of commentators have argued in favor of creating property rights in private
information. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But is it Mine? Toward Property Rights in
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 443-50 (2003) (arguing for an "opt-in" model
associated with treating private information as a property right); Lawrence Lessig, The
Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63 (1999) (arguing for a linkage between
private property rights and market incentives); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEo. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996) (discussing how
private information such as sexual identity and eye color is one's property and how the law must
deal with the question of who owns these property rights).
101. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 666 (1991).
102. Id. at 669-70.
103. Id.
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mistakes. First, while contract law as a whole may be a content-
neutral regulatory regime, in Cowles it was enforced in a way that
banned the publication of speech based on its content. This restriction
on speech was not merely "incidental": the plaintiff employed a body of
law that is neutral on its face but applied it in a content-based
manner. The defendant was punished because it published specified
content-the source's identity. This does not present a problem when
that neutral legal regime being enforced in a content-based manner is
contract law because the standard First Amendment concerns about
content-based restrictions are simply not implicated when the person
whose speech is abridged consented to the abridgment. If a person
cannot speak his mind because of a private contract that he agreed to,
that person has no one to blame but himself. This scenario does not
involve the government suppressing dissent or picking and choosing
what ideas may enter the market. This is not true, however, when the
neutral body of law being enforced in a content-based manner is tort
law or property law.
Second, even if Cowles did involve the application of a
generally applicable law, the Court mistakenly framed the issue as
whether the press, as distinct from all other speakers, had a special
right to gather and report the news. The Court has ruled on numerous
occasions that the press does not have any special privilege by virtue
of the free press clause of the First Amendment to ignore generally
applicable laws, such as labor, antitrust, and antidiscrimination
statutes, and that incidental burdens on the press produced by these
laws therefore do not present any First Amendment problems. 104
However, in Cowles, the enforcement of contract law affected the
newspaper as a speaker, not just as a member of the press, and
incidental burdens on speech do raise a First Amendment problem.10 5
Granting property rights in private information is
unconstitutional because it abridges speech based on content when the
censored party has not consented to the censorship. Although property
law as a whole may be a content-neutral regulatory regime, when it is
applied in a particular case to protect ownership interests in private
information the assertion of the property right becomes a content-
based interference. While such a regulatory regime may seem to have
an ostensibly neutral purpose, this so-called neutral purpose is merely
a fig leaf. One of the constitutive elements in the "bundle" of property
104. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act);
Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act);
Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 7 (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103, 130 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act).
105. Again, though, the application of contract law at issue in Cowles was by no means an
incidental interference with speech.
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rights is the right to exclude third parties from making use of one's
property. 106 Repackaging an explicit ban on certain speech as the
establishment of property rights in the underlying information that
the speech is based on does not change a content-based restriction into
a content-neutral one. The fact remains that, under this law, a private
individual could assert his or her property rights to prohibit speech
about a particular topic. Simply calling this right to prohibit
publication a property right does not change the fact that it is a
content-based interference with free speech.
B. Content-Neutral Restrictions on the Publication of Private
Information
Statutes that provide a right of action for the publication of
illegally-intercepted electronic transmissions protect private
information without targeting the content of the information and are
thus appropriately characterized as "content-neutral."'1 7 Laws that
prohibit the publication of such "stolen" information enhance the
security of private communication by removing an incentive for those
who deliberately intercept information for the purpose of
disseminating it to a wider audience. 08 This rationale is generally
referred to as the "dry up the market" theory. 0 9 Those who intercept
information may do so either for pecuniary gain or for some other
reason, such as causing embarrassment to a political opponent, and
the dry up the market theory is equally applicable to scenarios in
which the interceptor is motivated by pecuniary or some sort of
ideological or psychological gain. 10 Also, "stolen" speech bans act to
106. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
107. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) ("We agree with petitioners that [18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)], as well as its Pennsylvania analog, is in fact a content-neutral law of general
applicability."); id. at 544-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('The Court correctly observes that these
are 'content-neutral law[s] of general applicability'... [h]ere, Congress and the Pennsylvania
Legislature have acted 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' There is no
intimation that these laws seek 'to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate' or that they 'distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the
ideas or views expressed.' The antidisclosure provision is based solely upon the manner in which
the conversation was acquired, not the subject matter of the conversation or the viewpoints of the
speakers. The same information, if obtained lawfully, could be published with impunity."
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1968))).
108. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 550 ('The 'dry-up-the-market' theory... posits that it is possible to deter an
illegal act that is difficult to police by preventing the wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of the
crime ... ").
110. In Boehner v. McDermott, a Republican Congressman sued a Democratic Congressman
for leaking an intercepted electronic communication between Republican Congressmen that
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limit the harm done to individuals who have already been the victims
of illegal interceptions.11'
Because laws that bar the publication of illegally intercepted
communications do not ban publication based on content but rather
based on the means by which the information was obtained, they
would necessarily fail to prevent the publication of a wide array of
private information that is not obtained illegally. At the same time,
such laws would also bring within their scope a good deal of mundane
information whose content could by no means be characterized as
private. However, even if the content of a conversation itself is not
inherently private, protecting individuals' expectation of privacy when
having a conversation on the phone itself serves privacy interests. 112
Further, such laws would actually have the effect of protecting a
significant amount of inherently private content by virtue of the
simple fact that people communicate a good deal of personal
information in phone conversations, email, and other electronic
communications.
Professor Volokh argues that regardless of the privacy interests
served by such content-neutral laws, there are both functional and
doctrinal reasons why "[s]peech by people who have never promised to
remain quiet about something may not be suppressed simply because
someone else wrongfully revealed the information to them."" 3 On the
functional side, he asserts that punishing third party speakers for
publishing illegally obtained information would "dramatically
undermine newspapers' ability to report."" 4 Volokh is especially
concerned about the "dry up the market" and mitigation rationales
outlined above justifying punishing the publication of leaked
information, asserting that "[1]eaks of confidential information are a
staple of modern investigative journalism and have helped break
many important stories."" 5 Doctrinally, Volokh points out that such
regulations are problematic because they don't leave open "ample
alternative channels"-a speaker is completely barred from releasing
intercepted or leaked information." 6
revealed then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich might have violated an ethics agreement. Boehner
v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
111. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 ("[T]he disclosure of the contents of a private
conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself.").
112. Id. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1072.
114. Id.
115. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 741 (2003).
116. Id. at 741. Volokh makes this argument specifically regarding trade secret law, but the
point is equally applicable to any content-neutral law that bans publication because of some
impropriety in how it was originally obtained.
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Volokh's functional critique is certainly not without foundation.
Simply listing some of the news stories that would not have seen the
light of day without leaked information-Watergate, the Pentagon
Papers, warrantless wiretapping-provides powerful evidence that the
ability to print leaked information contributes substantially to the
Press's capacity to effectively perform its role as the "fourth branch" of
government. However, there are several points that seriously weaken
the potency of this argument in the privacy context. First, while
leaked information, particularly from government sources, may have
played a key role in breaking some of the biggest stories of the past
fifty years, there is much less evidence that illegally intercepted
communications are currently or will be a similarly fertile source.
117
Second, even if illegally intercepted communications were such a
fertile source for reporters, Volokh's functional critique does not
present a standard by which to judge how much interference with the
press is too much. He seems to subject these regulations to a rough
"smell" test and then declare by fiat that they simply go too far. While
he may be right, his "know it when I see it approach" leaves something
to be desired. Third, Volokh frames his functional argument as an
argument for a special privilege for the press, and the Court has been
extremely reticent to carve out special protections for the press beyond
those enjoyed by normal speakers.
118
Volokh's doctrinal critique may be on point, but it fails to
acknowledge the unique complexity of the problem. Regulations that
ban the publication of illegally intercepted information are very
different from the regulations that the Court has encountered in the
symbolic speech or time, place, or manner context. Stolen information
statutes raise unique concerns that at least at first glance do not seem
to fit perfectly into the Court's existing analytical framework. It is
important to understand whether the current framework can
appropriately be applied to these types of regulations and, if so, why
that might be.
The concept of a content-neutral regulation that limits the
publication of information based on the manner in which the
information was obtained presents a unique doctrinal problem. In the
117. But see Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517, 535 (upholding the media's right to broadcast "an
illegally intercepted cellular telephone conversation about a public issue" when the media was
not a participant in the interception); Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465-66, 478 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (upholding a law limiting a congressman's ability to disclose intercepted electronic
communication revealing then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich may have violated an ethics
agreement).
118. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (declining to establish a special press
privilege against disclosing confidential sources). But see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minneapolis Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983) (finding a special press privilege
against burdensome taxation).
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classic content-neutral scenario, a regulation limits only a means of
expression. 119 This scenario lends itself to a balancing analysis
because speakers generally have a variety of avenues through which
to express themselves, and barring a speaker from pursuing one
particular avenue does not prevent him from pursuing another. For
example, a speaker prohibited from using a sound truck in a
residential area can still hand out flyers or possibly use the sound
truck in a more commercial area. Some means of expression may be
more effective than others, thus the question presented in the classic
content-neutral scenario is not whether the speaker can speak, but
what means can the speaker employ to communicate his message.
Prohibiting one method of expression may lessen the effectiveness of
the speaker's message, but it would not outright prevent the speaker
from contributing a particular piece of information or opinion to the
marketplace of ideas.
In contrast, a content-neutral regulation that limits the
publication of information based on the manner in which the
information was obtained completely excludes that information from
the marketplace. What is so unique about this sort of regulation is
that, while it bans an entire category of speech, the category is defined
in a neutral way (stolen information). Because it is defined in a
neutral way, the limitation does not raise concerns that the
government is trying to shape and manipulate the substance of the
marketplace. However, such a law still results in the complete
exclusion of certain information from the marketplace of ideas, a
result which is fatal to the restriction under the standard content-
neutral analysis. Therefore, even assuming that a regulation banning
the publication of illegally intercepted information was narrowly
tailored and justified by a substantial government interest, the fact
that the regulation completely bars individuals from speaking about a
particular subject would seem to be unacceptable under the systemic
rights model.
However, because such a regulation presents unique doctrinal
problem, it is not immediately apparent that the standard content-
neutral framework can appropriately be applied to these types of
regulations. The standard content-neutral analysis assumes that the
total exclusion of a given category of information is deeply
problematic. However, on a purely visceral level, information that has
119. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (sleeping in
park as part of protest against homelessness); Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (posting signs on state-owned property); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1968) (burning draft card); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97
(1949) (sound trucks); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (leafleting).
2007] 265
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
been "stolen" seems like it simply seems like it does not belong in an
arena for the free exchange of ideas. Ripping information from its
original holder in order to disseminate it just does not match up with
the spirit of free and open debate that the First Amendment seeks to
protect, so it might be argued that it is acceptable to censor such
"stolen" information. This argument ultimately misses the mark
because it mistakenly conceives of the First Amendment as giving
speakers not only a right to speak freely but also a right to control
information. Yet it is worthwhile to run through the argument in
order to understand fully why this is the case.
While a ban on the publication of stolen information may
shrink the aggregate amount of information and opinion that reaches
the marketplace, such a decrease is not problematic if the lost
expression is not part of the marketplace ideal that the systemic
model seeks to advance. A version of this rationale was provided
above to justify the exclusion of certain content from the
marketplace.1 20 Unlike the "low" value speech exclusion, the rationale
for a stolen information exclusion could not be based on content
because such laws are by definition content-neutral. The stolen
information category can include any conceivable piece of information,
including information that may be relevant to a major policy debate.
However, the content of speech is not the only ground on which
it may permissibly be excluded under the systemic model. Illegally
intercepted information can arguably be excluded from the
marketplace of ideas. Such information is excludable not because of
the inherent "low" value of the intercepted information, but because
publishing such information violates the participatory nature of the
marketplace. Disclosing stolen information intuitively seems to violate
the spirit of the marketplace model. Under the systemic theory, the
primary value of free speech is that furthers democratic self-rule, and
the essence of self-rule is voluntary participation. The very definition
of democracy is that the power to choose lies with the people. It would
make little sense for the marketplace of ideas to operate in a way that
undermined this power to choose by allowing the marketplace to
operate in a coercive manner.
The Court's rhetoric about the vital importance of the "free
exchange of ideas" provides strong support for the proposition that it
envisions the First Amendment as embodying a participatory market
ideal. The Court has, on several occasions, spoken of a "profound
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas" that is "enshrined
in the First Amendment."'121 An "exchange" is a voluntary act in which
120. See infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989).
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a party willingly participates in a transaction. 122 If a party uses
coercion to achieve the same result, the interaction can no longer be
characterized as an "exchange."
The fundamentally democratic and participatory nature of the
marketplace ideal is well illustrated by one court's discussion of how
the Internet serves as a paradigm of the public forum that the First
Amendment seeks to further:
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to
achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and
indeed the world-has yet seen. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the
"democratizing' effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means
can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti-
Federalists may debate the structure of their government nightly, but these debates
occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in pamphlets. Modern-day Luthers still
post their theses, but to electronic bulletin boards rather than the door of the
Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a constitutional perspective, equally
important) dialogue occurs between aspiring artists, or French cooks, or dog lovers, or
fly fishermen.
12 3
As this passage makes clear, participation is an essential
element of the First Amendment's vision of the marketplace of ideas.
That vision is one of many active participants coming together in a
widely accessible forum to debate and perhaps at times angrily hurl
barbs at one another. While etiquette may not be a basic rule of the
game, 124 voluntary participation is.
Accordingly, publishing stolen information seems to violate the
participatory nature of the marketplace by coercing the contribution of
information that an individual does not want to disclose. The
publisher has used illegal and invasive methods to drag information
out of the private sphere and reveal it to the world. As a result, the
publisher's expression is not entitled to First Amendment protection
because it acts to coerce another person to speak, and speech which is
itself coercive is not part of the marketplace ideal that the systemic
model seeks to advance.
The problem with this argument is that publishing stolen
information does not coerce any individual to speak. If X intercepts a
private electronic communication by Y and then publishes facts
gleaned from that intercepted communication, Y has not been forced
to speak. While information that Y may previously have kept carefully
122. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 (1987) (defining
"exchange" in terms that suggest voluntary action, e.g., "to part with, give, or transfer in
consideration of something received as an equivalent")
123. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
124. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (referring to the aim of the First Amendment
as the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"
(citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964))).
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guarded in the private sphere has been forced out into the light of day,
this has not occurred through Y being forced to speak. X may have
forcibly wrenched information from Y, but this forcible wrenching and
any subsequent publication does not compel Y to communicate or
express anything. X has forcibly deprived Y of Y's exclusive control of
the information, but Y has not spoken or expressed anything simply
by virtue of the fact that information formerly in his control has been
released to the public. Therefore, the anti-coercion principle embodied
in the First Amendment has not been violated. The First Amendment
gives individuals a right to speak (or not speak); it does not give them
a right to control information.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE PRIVACY/SPEECH
CONFLICT: THE RIGHT HOLDINGS FOR THE WRONG REASONS
The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that have
implicated both speech and privacy rights, but in each case the Court
has explicitly declined to examine the fundamental underlying tension
between the two. Rather, the Court has asserted that it "continue[s] to
believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented
in clashes between [the] First Amendment and privacy rights counsel
relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the
appropriate context of the instant case."'125 The Court's reticence to
confront the broader doctrinal and theoretical issues presented by the
conflict between speech and privacy would be understandable if
overarching First Amendment doctrine were in a state of flux or had
been rendered obsolete by the emergence of a novel and unanticipated
scenario, but this is not the case. As discussed in Parts II, III, and IV,
the Court has established a comprehensive and nuanced approach to
speech cases that is well grounded in the underlying purpose of the
First Amendment and that is perfectly capable of dealing with the
tension between speech and privacy. Under this approach, laws that
restrict the publication of private information do not pass
constitutional muster.
This Part reviews the Supreme Court's treatment of the
tension between privacy and speech interests and critiques it in light
of the framework developed in the prior Parts of this note. While at
the end of the day the Court has always reached the conclusion
suggested by the above analysis, namely that both content-based and
content-neutral privacy laws are unconstitutional, it has not analyzed
cases that present a conflict between privacy and speech interests
125. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
533 (1989)).
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under the established First Amendment doctrinal framework. Instead,
the Court has adopted a completely ad hoc analytical approach and
avoided examining the fundamental relationship between privacy and
speech in the Constitutional order. In the content-based realm, the
Court's application of a high level of scrutiny to privacy statutes and
its repeated invalidation of such laws provides strong circumstantial
evidence that it would never find such a law to be constitutional.
Nonetheless, there is some language in these opinions suggesting that
under the right circumstances the Court might uphold a content-based
law. The Court invalidated the one content-neutral law that it has
confronted, and the majority's opinion in that case evinced a strong
hostility towards such laws. Still, it is unclear what standard of
scrutiny the Court applied in that case, and the opinion demonstrated
a troubling willingness to evaluate the relative value of public and
private speech.
A. Content-Based Regulations: Florida Star, Daily Mail, Oklahoma,
and Cox Broadcasting
Most of the cases in which the Court has dealt with the tension
between speech and privacy have involved content-based restrictions,
specifically laws that ban the publication of the names of juvenile
offenders 126 and rape victims. 127 In the first several cases in which it
confronted laws that banned speech based upon its private content,
the Court struck down the restrictions. However, it did so primarily on
the narrow grounds that reporting on the contents of official court
records open to public inspection implicated especially strong First
Amendment interests.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the question of whether
imposing liability on a media outlet for the publication of private
information violated the First Amendment in the 1975 case Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.12 In Cox Broadcasting, a reporter
learned the name of a rape and murder victim by examining
indictments that were public records made available for his inspection
in the courtroom. 129 The reporter broadcast a report regarding the
court proceedings that named the victim on a television news
program. 130 The Court held that a state may not impose sanctions on
the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from
126. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 97-98 (1979); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla.
County Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1977).
127. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526; Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975).
128. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 491.
129. Id. at 472-73.
130. Id. at 473-74.
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judicial records maintained in connection with a public prosecution
and that are open to public inspection. 131 The Supreme Court
expressed doubt that information that appeared in the public record
was even "private" at all, stating that "the prevailing law of invasion
of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when
the information involved already appears on the public record."'132 The
Court found that the interest in allowing the press to report on the
contents of official court records open to public inspection outweighed
any diminished privacy interest that existed. 133 The Court stressed
the special importance of the press being able to report on public
records, stating, "The freedom of the press to publish that information
appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public
business."1
34
The Cox Broadcasting Court was also troubled by the ease with
which the state could have pursued alternative means to protect the
identity of the victim that were not as problematic from a First
Amendment perspective. Noting that the states could avoid the public
dissemination of private information released to the public in court
documents by simply not releasing the private information, the Court
stated, "If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial
proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public
documentation or other exposure of private information."' 135
Two years after Cox Broadcasting was decided, the Court
reaffirmed the principle that the First Amendment barred any
prohibition on the publication of information obtained from a judicial
hearing or record open to the public in order to protect an individual's
privacy in Oklahoma Publishing Company v. Oklahoma County
District Court.1 36 In Oklahoma Publishing, despite a state law
providing that juvenile proceedings were to be held in private "unless
specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted in public," and that
juvenile records were to be made open to public inspection "only by
order of the court to persons having a legitimate interest therein,"
reporters were in fact present at a detention hearing for a juvenile
accused of second degree murder and as a result learned and later
published the juvenile's name along with a photograph of him leaving
131. Id. at 491.
132. Id. at 494-95.
133. Id. at 495.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 496.
136. Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla. County Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977).
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the courthouse. 137 Because, as in Cox Broadcasting, this private
information was "publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution
of the crime," the Court unanimously found that a pre-trial order
enjoining members of the news media from "publishing, broadcasting,
or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture of [a] minor
child in connection with a juvenile proceeding involving that child
then pending in that court" was an unconstitutional abridgement of
the freedom of the press. 138
Shortly after Oklahoma Publishing, the Court began to issue
more sweeping statements about the protections that would be
afforded speech about private matters. In Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., the Court handed down another unanimous opinion.
This time it reversed the criminal conviction of a newspaper for
publishing the name of an alleged juvenile murderer. 3 9 In Daily Mail,
reporters had obtained the identity of the alleged offender from
various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney at
the crime scene. 140 After reviewing its prior decisions, the Court
observed, "None of these opinions directly controls this case; however,
all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials
may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent
a need to further a state interest of the highest order."' 41 The Daily
Mail Court found that the asserted state interest of protecting the
anonymity of the juvenile offender in order to "further his
rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further
antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future
employment or suffer other consequences for this single offense," did
not constitute a state interest of the highest order. 142 The Court went
on to say, "If the information is lawfully obtained, as it was here, the
state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further
an interest more substantial than is present here."'143 Even if a state
interest of the highest order were present, the Court continued, the
statute at issue did not accomplish its stated purpose because it only
restricted newspapers, not electronic media. 144 Finally, the Court
pointed out that there was no evidence that the extreme measure of
137. Id. at 310-11.
138. Id. at 308-09, 311 (citing Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 471).
139. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1979).
140. Id. at 99.
141. Id. at 103.
142. Id. at 104.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 104-05.
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imposing criminal penalties was necessary to protect the
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. 145
In the next case dealing with the conflict between privacy and
speech, the Court again announced that laws seeking to protect
private information would be subject to a very high level of scrutiny.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court held that a newspaper could not be
held civilly liable for publishing the name of a rape victim it had
obtained from a police report. 146 The Court analyzed the case under
the principle that it had first (somewhat tentatively) suggested 147 in
Daily Mail: "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order."'148 Applying the Daily
Mail principle, the Court held that subjecting the Florida Star to civil
liability for publishing B.J.F's name violated the First Amendment. 49
The Court found that the heightened scrutiny of the Daily Mail
principle was triggered because the newspaper had "lawfully
obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public
significance."' 50 While, under Florida law, the names of sexual assault
victims are not matters of public record and police departments have a
duty not to "cause or allow" them to be published, the Florida Star
majority pointed out that there was no law that made the receipt of
such information illegal.' 51 The Court also concluded that it was
"clear" the news article satisfied the test's public significance
requirement because "the article generally, as opposed to the specific
identity contained within it, involved a matter of paramount public
import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which
had been reported to authorities."'' 52 In other words, if an event is
145. Id. at 105.
146. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524-26 (1989).
147. The Daily Mail opinion had announced this principle less as a definitive governing
standard and more as a principle that was merely suggested by previous cases, stating "None of
these opinions directly controls this case; however, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials
may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order." 443 U.S. at 103.
148. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
149. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
150. Id. at 536 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
151. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536. The Court skirted the issue of whether a law restricting the
receipt of such information would pass constitutional muster, saying only, "Even assuming the
Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information, Florida has not taken this
step." Id.
152. See id. at 536-37. The Court eschewed making a substantive distinction for the purposes
of the Daily Mail principle between the public significance of the victim's name and the
commission of the crime generally, stating "the article generally, as opposed to the specific
272 [Vol. 60:1:235
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newsworthy, then the names of those involved in the event are also
newsworthy.
153
The Florida Star majority held that the state had not made the
requisite showing that there existed "a need to further a state interest
of the highest order," as required under the Daily Mail principle when
the state seeks to impose liability for the publication of lawfully
obtained truthful information about a matter of public significance. 154
Although the majority opinion acknowledged the "highly significant
interests" that the state had in protecting the identity of rape victims,
including "the privacy of victims of sexual offenses; the physical safety
of such victims, who may be targeted for retaliation if their names
become known to their assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims
of such crimes to report these offenses without fear of exposure," the
identity contained within it, involved a matter of paramount public import; the commission, and
investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to authorities." Id. This is not the
approach that most courts have taken in determining newsworthiness in the tort context, where
the newsworthiness of identifying and other highly specific information in a news report is
analyzed separately from the newsworthiness of the general underlying events in the tort
context. See, e.g., Veilleux v. NBC, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38 (D. Me. 1998) ("While drug use
among interstate truck drivers, because of the threat it poses to the safety of others on the
highway, is clearly a matter of legitimate public concern, the identity of a single driver who
tested positive is not, as a matter of law, an issue of legitimate concern to the public where there
is nothing otherwise 'newsworthy' about the driver or the particular test."); Baugh v. CBS, Inc.,
828 F. Supp. 745, 755 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (although domestic violence is of legitimate public
concern, plaintiff's personal experience with domestic violence is not newsworthy as a matter of
law); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 38-44 (Cal. 1971) (although facts of past
crime of hijacking were newsworthy, identifying plaintiffs name was not newsworthy because
the hijacking had occurred eleven years previously and plaintiff had given up his life of crime),
overruled by Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004) (no claim arises from
the publication of truthful information obtained from official public court records under Cox
Broadcasting); Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558, 561-64 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (newsworthiness of the identity of witness to a rape and murder was a question of fact for
the jury); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (plaintiff successfully stated
cause of action for invasion of privacy when newspaper identified plaintiff, who at the time of
publication had "assumed a place in respectable society," by name as the real life inspiration for
a movie about a prostitute); Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (although the subject of poorly performed plastic surgery in foreign countries is a
matter of public interest, plaintiffs identity is not); Multimedia WMLAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443
S.E.2d 491, 494-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (while topic of AIDS is of legitimate public interest, the
identities of AIDS victims are not); Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (focusing on the newsworthiness of specific photographs of a victim of gang violence and
statements made by a grieving mother to her dead child, not the newsworthiness of the general
topic of gang warfare, and finding that the newsworthiness for the former created a question of
fact); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (while general topic of abortion is
of public concern, plaintiffs identities are not); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 877-78
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (although the subject of unique love relationships is of public concern, it is
a question of fact for the jury whether the same can be said of specific details of how a woman
participated in a surrogate parenting trio and was unable to have children due to previous
abortions).
153. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
154. Id. at 537.
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Court found that "imposing liability for publication under the
circumstances of this case is too precipitous a means of advancing
these interests to convince us that there is a 'need' within the meaning
of the Daily Mail formulation for Florida to take this extreme step."'155
Specifically, the Court pointed to the fact that the government could
have used alternative means to safeguard the information at issue,
such as not releasing it in the first place, that the sweeping negligence
per se standard for the publication of a rape victim's name was not
sensitive to the facts of a particular case, and that the statute only
prohibited publication in an "instrument of mass communication,"
which raised "serious doubts" about whether the statute was actually
serving its alleged purpose.
156
B. Evaluating the Court's Content-Based Jurisprudence
The Daily Mail standard closely resembles the strict scrutiny
approach that the Court employs in the content-based realm. Both
require that the state assert a very strong reason for a speech
suppressing regulation-a "compelling interest" under the traditional
strict scrutiny test and a "highest order interest" under Daily Mail.
The narrow-tailoring requirement of the traditional strict scrutiny test
appears to be built into the Daily Mail standard's requirement that
there be a "need" to further the asserted highest order interest-there
is no "need" if a regulation is underinclusive, overly punitive, or
ineffective, or if there are alternative means of accomplishing its
purpose that do not offend the First Amendment. 15 7 The Daily Mail
and traditional content-based standard thus both seem to apply a
substantially similar strict scrutiny review.
Despite this similarity, there are several reasons why the
Court's failure to use the traditional content-based standard is
problematic. First, Daily Mail strict scrutiny review is not triggered
by the nature of the regulation, but rather by the nature of the speech.
Rather than being held presumptively unconstitutional on the
grounds that it seeks to distort the substance of the marketplace of
ideas, a content-based regulation is only unconstitutional under Daily
Mail if it regulates a particularly worthy kind of speech. The Daily
Mail strict scrutiny standard only applies if the information contained
in the publication is (1) truthful; (2) lawfully obtained; and (3) about a
matter of public significance. The truthfulness requirement for
triggering Daily Mail strict scrutiny does not pose a problem because
155. Id.
156. Id. at 537-40.
157. See id. at 537-41; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979).
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false statements of fact are properly characterized as "low" value
speech because they not part of the ultimate marketplace ideal. 58
However, the other two requirements do pose serious problems. As
discussed above, publishing unlawfully obtained information cannot
be viewed as violating the marketplace ideal that the systemic model
seeks to advance. Speech that communicates stolen information
cannot be banned on the grounds that it is of inherently "low" value or
because it violates the participatory nature of the marketplace. 59
There is therefore no justification for categorically excluding "stolen"
information from First Amendment protection. This Note has already
offered an in-depth critique of inquiring into the "public significance"
of private information in order to determine whether the constitution
protects speech that communicates such information. 160
The second reason why the Court's creation of a separate Daily
Mail strict scrutiny standard problematic is that this creates a
parallel body of strict scrutiny First Amendment jurisprudence that is
not bound by traditional strict scrutiny precedent and in turn is not
binding as precedent on traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny
doctrine. While a "highest order" interest does seem to be of roughly
the same weight as a "compelling" interest, the subsequent holdings
could reveal that these categories only roughly overlap, and that an
interest that is declared to be of the "highest order" in the privacy
context would not be found to be "compelling" under the standard
content-based analysis. Creating this two-headed monster
accomplishes nothing and only risks confusion.
Despite these critiques, there is reason to believe that the Daily
Mail test is sufficiently stringent that in practice it would lead to the
same results as the traditional content-based strict scrutiny standard.
While the Florida Star, Daily Mail, Oklahoma, and Cox Broadcasting
opinions do not hold explicitly that content-based restrictions on
private content are unconstitutional, they seem to imply it. Although
tthe Court has taken pains to continually express its deep solicitude
for privacy interests, emphasize the limited nature of its rulings
barring liability for the publication of private information, and hold
out the possibility that in a future case the First Amendment may
have to bow to a pressing privacy concern, it is likely that the Court is
simply being disingenuous. The Court has set the bar for overcoming
the First Amendment so high that no plaintiff stands a realistic
chance at collecting damages from a media defendant for disclosing
lawfully obtained, truthful information about a matter of public
158. See supra notes 28-29, 150 and accompanying text.
159. See supra Part IV.B.2.
160. See supra Part IV.A.1.
20071 275
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
significance. Professor Peter Edelman, who takes a starkly different
view than this Note does on the desirability of upholding content-
based restrictions on the publication of private information, 161 concurs
in this realpolitik assessment of the Florida Star line of cases and
asserts that the Court is simply paying lip service to privacy rights.
162
The Court has found for the defendant in every case in which a
plaintiff sought damages for the publication of private information.
This provides some support for the proposition that the Court's
dedication to privacy in content-based speech cases is merely
rhetorical and lacks substance. Talk, after all, is cheap, and at the end
of the day the actual outcomes of the cases are probably more
indicative of the Court's true sympathies than noncommittal dicta and
vaguely articulated standards. For example, the Cox Broadcasting
Court's narrow emphasis on the First Amendment problems
associated with punishing the publication of information made readily
available by the state in public records would reasonably lead one to
believe that punishing the publication of information not found in
public records and which the state had taken measures to protect
would not be similarly constitutionally problematic. As Justice White
stated in his Florida Star dissent, "Cox Broadcasting stands for the
proposition that the State cannot make the press its first line of
defense in withholding private information from the public-it cannot
ask the press to secrete private facts that the State makes no effort to
safeguard in the first place."163 The State of Florida likely believed
that by not making the names of sexual assault victims matters of
public record and by criminalizing the dissemination of this
information, the state's rape shield law would not meet the same fate
as the Georgia rape shield law that was struck down in Cox
Broadcasting. As Justice White pointed out, "Florida has done
precisely what we suggested, in Cox Broadcasting, that States wishing
to protect the privacy rights of rape victims might do: 'respond [to the
challenge] by means which avoid public documentation or other
exposure of private information.' "164 Florida's experience should give
161. Writing in the wake of the Florida Star decision, Edelman asserted that
the Court's analysis reflects what may be a pervasive problem-that courts have little
devotion to personal privacy interests, relative to most other important or worthy
values. The Court's disrespect for the Florida rape-victim-anonymity statute may
exemplify its underlying rejection of personal privacy, and, more particularly, the
unique privacy interests of rape victims, as interests worthy of protection.
See Edelman, supra note 73, at 1195, 1223.
162. Id. at 1207. Edelman also refers to the Justices in the Florida Star majority as
"absolutists in balancers' clothing." Id. at 1223.
163. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 544 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 547.
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pause to those seeking to predict the future contours of the Court's
privacy jurisprudence based on the subtle hints and hedged assertions
of the Court's existing opinions.
However, while there is good reason to believe that the Court
has endorsed the view of content-based privacy restrictions mandated
by the systemic rights model of free speech, the Court has not
foreclosed the possibility that a statutory scheme addressing all the
Court's concerns could withstand constitutional muster. While it may
be difficult to imagine a privacy interest greater than the one at stake
in Florida Star, the Court did not necessarily find that protecting the
privacy of a rape victim fell short of being a "highest order" interest. In
explaining why B.J.F. had not satisfied the Daily Mail principle, the
Court wrote that "imposing liability for publication under the
circumstances of this case is too precipitous a means of advancing
these interests to convince us that there is a 'need' within the meaning
of the Daily Mail formulation for Florida to take this extreme step."'
165
The opinion seems to have taken issue not so much with the gravity or
importance of the interests at stake but rather the manner in which
Florida proscribed truthful publication in order to effectuate those
interests.' 66 To put it another way, the Court did not necessarily find
the interests at stake to be inadequate; it found the means adopted to
pursue those interests to be inadequate.
Following in this vein, a number of courts have speculated that
the firm establishment of the Daily Mail principle in Florida Star did
not necessarily sound the death knell for restrictions on speech that
provide a right of actions for the publication of private content.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
Judge Richard Posner asserted, "We do not think the Court was being
coy in Cox or Florida Star in declining to declare the tort of publicizing
intensely personal facts totally defunct." 167 The Eighth Circuit
expressly agreed with Posner's assessment and stated that
after reviewing Supreme Court precedent and the decisions of other circuits that have
faced the tension between the First Amendment's protection of free speech and state-law
actions in tort for the invasion of privacy, we conclude that speech that reveals truthful
and accurate facts about a private individual can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of its constitutionally proscribable content.
16 8
165. Id. at 537 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
166. See id.
167. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
168. Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997).
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C. Content-Neutral Regulations: Bartnicki
In the only case the Court has heard involving a content-
neutral regulation that restricts the publication of private
information, it struck down the statute as an unconstitutional
abridgement of the freedom of speech. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, an
unknown individual illegally intercepted and recorded a cellular
phone conversation about contract negotiations between two teachers'
union officials, in which one of the officials made a threatening remark
about the school board.169 The president of a local taxpayers' group
found a tape of the conversation in his mailbox and gave it to a radio
commentator who played it on the air.170 Union officials sued the radio
commentator under a federal law making it illegal to disclose the
contents of an oral, wire, or electronic communication where the
disclosing party knew or had reason to know that the information was
illegally intercepted. 
171
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens found that the
wiretapping statute was a content-neutral restriction on speech:
The statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations,
nor is it justified by reference to the content of those conversations. Rather, the
communications at issue are singled out by virtue of the fact that they were illegally
intercepted-by virtue of the source, rather than the subject matter.
172
The majority opinion also declared that fostering private
speech by protecting private communications was an interest "of the
highest order. ' 173 The Court discussed two ways that punishing
publication would further this "highest order" interest: first, it would
deter parties from intercepting private conversations in the first place;
and second, it would "minimize the harm to persons whose
conversations have been illegally intercepted" by preventing an even
larger circle of people form learning the contents of the
conversation. 174
On the first issue, Justice Stevens's opinion asserted that
punishing publication would not achieve the goal of deterring illegal
interceptions since the state's ability to directly punish the
169. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001). One of the officials, the president of
the union, stated that "[i]f they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to
their, their homes. . . . To blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of
those guys." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
170. Id. at 519.
171. Id. at 523-24.
172. Id. at 526.
173. Id. at 518.
174. Id. at 529, 533.
[Vol. 60:1:235278
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
intercepting party provided an adequate deterrence. 175 Although the
intercepting party in Bartnicki actually remained anonymous, the
majority opinion shrugged this off as a rare and "exceptional case."
176
On the second issue the majority acknowledged that a
"considerably stronger" argument could be made for the assertion that
punishing publication would minimize the harm to those whose
private conversations had already been intercepted, and Justice
Stevens was not able to point to any other alternative means of
furthering this interest.177 Stevens acknowledged that "the disclosure
of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater
intrusion on privacy than the interception itself."'178 However,
ultimately the Bartnicki majority found that despite the fact that the
law was narrowly tailored to serve a "highest order" interest, "[i]n
these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance."'1
79
D. Evaluating the Court's Content-Neutral Jurisprudence
The Bartnicki opinion is deeply flawed for a number of reasons.
While the Court eventually came out on the right side of the issue, it
did not get there for the right reasons. First, it is unclear exactly what
standard the Court actually applied in striking down the statute.
While the Court refers to the wiretapping statute as content-neutral
and it "balance[s]" competing interests to determine the statute's
constitutionality, the Court also cites the strict scrutiny standard of
the Daily Mail test. 80 Justice Rehnquist believed that the Court was
in truth applying the latter standard.' 8 ' He criticized the majority in
his dissent for its "tacit application of strict scrutiny."'8 2 This
ambiguity in the Court's analysis perhaps reflects the Court's poor
grasp of the novelty of the analytical problem posed by a regulation
that limits the publication of information based on the manner in
which the information was obtained. 8 3 Such laws are content-neutral
and thus seem to merit only a balancing analysis, but at the same
175. Id. at 530-31. Justice Stevens explained that the identity of the intercepting party was
generally known since he or she typically sought financial reward, public praise, or intercepted
the communication in connection with a domestic dispute. Id.
176. Id. at 531.
177. Id. at 532-34.
178. Id. at 533.
179. Id. at 534.
180. Id. at 527-28, 533.
181. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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time they ban an entire category of speech from the market and as a
result seem per se unconstitutional.1 8 4 The appearance of a strict
scrutiny application may simply be the product of a poor articulation
of this analysis.
The second problem with the majority opinion is that it
considers the relative value of public and private speech in its
analysis. The Court found the fact that the speech at issue was of
"public concern," as opposed to "information of purely private concern,"
such as "trade secrets or domestic gossip," to be a relevant factor in its
analysis of whether speech was constitutionally protected. 8 5 As
discussed in Part IV.A.1., there is no reason to think that "private"
speech is any less newsworthy than other kinds of speech, and even if
such a distinction were theoretically sound, many of the facts that the
Court has classified as "not of public concern" are quite obviously just
the opposite. 8 6 Further, assuming that the Court actually was
applying a content-neutral balancing test, the importance or "public
concern" of the speech plays no role in the analysis. Such an
evaluation and balancing of the importance of content is exactly what
First Amendment law seeks to avoid. Rather, the relevant inquiry on
the speaker's side concerns what alternative channels are left open to
the speaker and whether these alternative channels are as effective as
the restricted means of expression. As discussed above, the outcome of
such a balancing analysis must necessarily be that the regulation is
unconstitutional, because there are no alternative channels-the
statute completely banned the dissemination of the facts obtained
through the illegal interception of electronic communication.
A third problem with the Bartnicki opinion is its cursory
dismissal of the argument that punishing the publication of
intercepted information was a necessary and effective way of
disincentivizing interceptions. While even a finding that these
interests were compelling or very substantial would not have
ultimately saved the statute under a balancing analysis, the Court
was wrong to pin its invalidation of the statute on the efficacy of the
means employed by the statute to further privacy interests. The "dry-
up the market theory" is a plausible mechanism for deterring
upstream illegal conduct "that undergirds numerous laws, such as the
prohibition of the knowing possession of stolen goods."18 7 While, as the
majority points out, the identity of the initial intercepting agent is
184. Id.
185. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533-35.
186. Volokh, supra note 115, at 743 ("Every time the Court has decided that certain speech is
not on a matter of public concern, it has erred.").
187. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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known in most wiretapping cases, and can therefore be punished
directly, these few cases may represent a skewed sample.1 18 Clearly
there are some cases, most notably Bartnicki itself, in which the
identity of the initial interceptor is not known, and thus the threat of
direct punishment of the intercepting party may not provide a
sufficient disincentive. The Court points out that "there is no
empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition
against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions,"' 18 9 but
this is an unfair criticism due to the inherent design difficulty of
constructing a rigorous empirical study on the effectiveness of such a
publication ban. 190
VI. CONCLUSION
Vigorous dedication to the principle of free speech is most
needed when it is easy to sympathize with those who would benefit
from censorship. Free speech is an abstract concept, and the harm to a
person who has had the most intimate details about their lives
revealed in the pages of a newspaper or broadcast on the nightly news
may seem to far outweigh the harm of a small amount of censorship in
any particular case. Nonetheless, while the short-term tangible
benefits of a vigorous marketplace of ideas at times may be difficult to
see, free speech is a vital structural element of democratic government
that holds a central position in the constitutional order.
Granting privacy rights that provide individuals "a right to
stop people from speaking about you"191 in specified circumstances
may be appealing when a sympathetic victim seems to have been
bullied and unnecessarily exposed by the press, but such a right is
incompatible with the First Amendment. Restricting the publication of
private information implicates the same First Amendment concerns
that are raised whenever the government suppresses speech. The
Court has developed an effective doctrinal framework for dealing with
government regulation of speech, and under this framework both
content-based and content-neutral restrictions on the dissemination of
private information do not pass constitutional muster.
While the Supreme Court has addressed the tension between
speech and privacy in a number of cases, it has failed to apply directly
its overarching doctrinal framework for speech cases to this conflict.
Rather, the Court's decisions in this area have either rested upon
188. Id. at 530 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 530-31.
190. Id. at 552-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1049.
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narrow grounds unique to a specific statutory scheme or have been
decided with only the most perfunctory analysis. The Court has failed
to adopt a coherent approach to this area of the law or identify the
fundamental theoretical and doctrinal tensions at work. While the
Court has always reached the right result, it has done so only after
laying a poorly drawn roadmap to guide lower courts and after
providing few concrete assurances that it will continue on its current
tack.
However, the Court's failure to articulate a coherent approach
to cases that present a conflict between privacy and speech must be
placed in the proper context. The Court's discomfort with the real
world implications of its decisions in some of these cases is almost
palpable, yet each time at least a majority of the Court was willing to
defend abstract principles of free speech despite the presence of strong
personal sympathies tugging in the direction of censorship. A brief
perusal of speech cases from the first half of the twentieth century
reveals that the Court has not always been as able to resist the
temptation to check its personal sympathies and biases at the door
when evaluating a First Amendment claim. 192 Thus, while there is
much to condemn in the Court's treatment of the conflict between
privacy and speech, there is also something to celebrate.
Jared Lenow*
192. See, e.g. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding a conviction for
being a member of the Communist Party); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927)
(upholding a conviction for being a member of an anarchist organization); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 671-72 (1925) (upholding a conviction for distributing a socialist manifesto);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (upholding a conviction for distributing
pamphlets advocating a general strike during wartime); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
216-17 (1919) (upholding the conviction of socialist leader Eugene Debs for criticizing the United
States' entry into World War I and expressing support for those who did not register for the
draft); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (upholding a conviction for
publishing articles criticizing the United States' entry into World War I and sympathizing with
those who resist the draft); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (upholding a
conviction for distributing pamphlets criticizing military conscription).
* I would like to thank Professor Thomas McCoy for providing invaluable guidance and
feedback throughout the Note-writing process, and the members of the Law Review editorial
board who offered helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Kelly Gerhard,
Anna Lazarus, and Lauren Webb for their constructive criticisms of, among other things, the
arguments made in this Note.
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